This Wall Street Journal ($) article relates the interesting story of Marine Colonel Joe D. Dowdy, who was relieved of his command during the U.S. invasion of Iraq last year. Not only is this a fascinating story about the pressures involved in commanding a Marine regiment in battle, but it also provides insight into the battlefield tactics that the U.S. military has executed brilliantly and effectively in the last three major military operations — Desert Strorm, Afghanistan, and the latest Iraq operation:

A potential 150-mile bypass around Nasiriyah didn’t seem feasible. Col. Dowdy wasn’t sure he had enough fuel and didn’t know what resistance he might face. The First Regiment was stuck.
The halt was anathema to Gen. Mattis, a devotee of a modern military doctrine known as “maneuver warfare.” Though Marines have practiced the technique for years, the Iraqi war was its first large-scale test. Instead of following rigid battle plans and attacking on well-defined fronts, this tactic calls for smaller forces to move quickly over combat zones, exploiting opportunities and sowing confusion among the enemy. The technique is summed up in Gen. Mattis’ radio call name: “Chaos.”

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The issue of speed in Iraq remains in debate. Last fall, the Army War College, a Pentagon-financed school where officers analyze tactics, released a study saying there was little evidence that speed affected the outcome of the war. The stiff resistance outside Baghdad suggests U.S. forces may have done better by moving at a more measured pace, entering more cities, rooting out fighters and leaving more troops in the provinces to enforce order, the report said.
However, in another study yet to be finalized, the military’s Joint Center for Lessons Learned says speed was integral to U.S. military success in Iraq. In a speech in February, Adm. E.P. Giambastiani, commander of the Joint Forces, said speed “reduces decision and execution cycles, creates opportunities, denies an enemy options and speeds his collapse.”

As noted in this earlier post, the creative and effective military tactics used in the current Iraq operation and the two earlier operations were not embraced easily within the military establishment. Author Robert Coram’s book, “Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War,” presents a compelling story of how dedicated military experts outside of the Pentagon establishment fought over a 20 year period to change traditional Pentagon thinking on military tactics. As noted in the earlier post, appearances are deceiving with regard to the Pentagon, the special interests that attempt to control it, and the elected officials who attempt to lead it.
This is not a story that the mainstream media covers well, so Mr. Coram’s book and a few others are essential to an understanding of the way in which the U.S. Armed Forces confront issues of military tactics in modern warfare. It is particularly noteworthy that, during their service in the Reagan, first Bush, and current Bush Administrations, Messrs. Rumsfeld, Cheney and Powell have been leaders at the forefront of facilitating these new ideas on military tactics. Their support for those new ideas has often put them at odds with the Pentagon establishment, which is a “behind the scenes” conflict that the mainstream media has largely ignored. That is an important point to remember during this political season when these public servants will likely be accused of being lapdogs for the military establishment.