The ubiquitous Richard Posner reviews in this New Republic Online article (free registration req’d) two new books about the law clerks of the United States Supreme Court — Courtiers of the Marble Palace: The Rise And Influence of the Supreme Court Law Clerk (Stanford 2006) and Sorcerers’ Apprentices: 100 Years of Law Clerks at the United States Supreme Court (NYU Press 2006) — which provide a glimpse of how the modern Supreme Court operates. It’s an entertaining and informative review, reflected by the following blurb:

Except for Justice John Paul Stevens, who writes his own first drafts of opinions, law clerks write the first drafts of their justices’ opinions. (According to Courtiers, Stevens’s clerks rewrite his drafts extensively, thus producing an inversion of the normal relation of clerk-author to justice-editor. In another inversion, Justice Harry Blackmun, a genuine eccentric, left the opinion-writing to his clerks after his first years on the Court and concentrated on cite-checking their drafts. He was by all accounts an awesome cite-checker.) Some justices rewrite the clerks’ opinion drafts extensively, others little. Sorcerers’ Apprentices estimates that 30 percent of the opinions published by the Supreme Court are almost entirely the work of the law clerks; and as they are the primary drafters of most of the other opinions as well, probably more than half the written output of the Court is clerk-authored.

Judge Posner is particularly interested in whether the elaborate Supreme Court law clerk system has actually resulted in improvement in the quality of the Court’s decisions:

[O]ne can apply quality-related criteria, such as clarity, brevity, guidance provided to the lower courts, and candor in explaining the true grounds of decision, to the opinions in the two eras.
When one does this, one is not likely to find a dramatic, or perhaps any, overall difference in quality. Today’s opinions are longer–a dubious virtue. There are more separate opinions, most of which are ephemeral. Today’s opinions are more polished, more “scholarly,” and more carefully cite-checked, but these are modest virtues. Neither judges nor their clerks are scholars. The scholarly apparatus of judicial opinions belongs to the rhetoric rather than the substance of judicial decision-making.

Read the entire review.