Francis Fukuyama is a professor at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins, an award-winning author and a former neoconservative supporter of the Bush Administration’s Iraq policy (previous post here).
As a result, Fukuyama’s new book — America at the Crossroads (Yale 2006) — that summarizes Fukuyama’s views on neoconservatism, why he parted ways with other neocons on the Iraq war, and where we go from here is causing quite a stir in foreign policy circles. The NY Times’ Michiko Kakutani has this favorable review of Fukuyama’s book while the Wall Street Journal’s Bret Stephens weighs in with this critical one. Finally, in this NPO piece, Victor Davis Hanson makes the case for holding the line in Iraq.
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a couple of weeks ago CSPAN’s booknotes program carried a several hour interview.
As I understood Fukuyama, he never supported the idea of the war. His destruction of any attempt at intellectual organization on the part of the administration’s neoconservatism was stunning.
The situation in Iraq is improving. Terrorist activity is decreasing and fewer people are being murdered. At the most, the terrorists kill roughly 250 weekly. I suspect as many Iraqis die in auto accidents. We must not forget that the countryís population totals about 26 million people. Do the math. Most Iraqis barely notice the terrorism. It does not impact their lives on a consistent basis. Moreover, the economy is continuously growing. Ralph Peters is also optimistic. Instapundit provided this link:
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/03/myths_of_iraq.html
Why do we hear so much bad news concerning Iraq? The ìelitesî are worried about losing their privileges. Many people like myself increasingly laugh at Francis Fukuyama and the other so-called experts. The emperor is naked and we are not hesitant in saying so. Fukuyama probably just want to be perceived as a cool dude. Unfortunately, this requires one to join the ìhate Bushî crowd.
Hi Tom,
I would like to respond to the previous post.
As a veteran of the Iraq War, I am not at all optimistic.
I served there for 11 months, 9 months of which was spent patrolling for roadside bombs (IEDs) for the 82nd Airborne Division in Fallujah. I was there from the invasion until March 2004.
What I observed was massive incompetence in the CPA and on the part of the US Army. Granted, I was a lowly platoon leader, but I found that battlefield commanders as high as full Colonel (Brigade commanders) did not understand the difference between Shia and Sunni Muslims as late as March 2004. Many of them made no effort to understand the tribal politics of Anbar–they took the simplistic view that they were all “bad guys” and made error after error.
The problem is that the command supplemented Neocon dogma and idealism for cold-blooded analysis. For example, I saw many senior officers who, with the best of intentions, insisted on an American-style open bidding system for contracts in the area. Most construction companies in that area are owned by tribes. Once the bid was awarded, the construction site would come under attack from “insurgents.” These insurgents turned out to be rival Sunni tribes. That is, the same tribes who were allied against us would kill one another over money. What I’m getting at is when the administration called the insurgents “dead enders” and “criminals,” that immediately became the dogma of mid-level commanders on the ground. All of this when, in the view of company level and below commanders, it was very apparent that the insurgents were smart, highly organized although in fractured cells, and NOT mostly foreign fighters. For most of 2003-04, the mantra among the command and in the administration was that foreign fighters were causing all of the problems. Not so, and now we know it.
The only area where this wasn’t as bad of a problem was the Mosul area under the 101st Airborne Division under who I consider to be by far and away the most competent general in the US Army, David Petraeus. He apparently hired the tribes to protect infrastructure, cut deals with the Syrians for electricity and oil, etc. He did much of this if not all in contravention to the CPA’s wishes, sometimes in almost open defiance of their orders.
Many of my men have returned to Iraq for subsequent tours (I am now out). They say that the insurgency is alive and well. They are surprised at how much American forces have ceased to patrol–and tell me that per patrol, both casualties and attacks are actually up, not down. Moreover, they say that the emphasis is now on air transport, not on convoys, also cutting back on attacks. When I was there, we suffered the most harrowing attacks not when we were patrolling, but when on convoys. Our belief was better to be a door-kicker than a truck driver. Their view–on subsequent tours–is that (1) the Iraqi army is worthless–mostly Shia militiamen intent on exacting revenge on Sunnis (2) the Kurds have no interest whatsoever in being a part of Iraq and will continue to be de facto independent and (3) our infrastructure “investment” has been a total failure. They are shocked that the gas lines–miles and miles long–are still there if not worse. Would you be pissed off if you had to wait 2 days for a tank of gas???
At bottom, I’m deeply disappointed in the administration. When you do business, you always try to squeeze the most out of the minimum of resources. And I suppose that if this were WWIII, you’d do that in military operations. But that’s not the case with Iraq. America has virtually unlimited resources to win this war, and we’re too selfish and too cowardly to do it. Never once have I seen the president get up on his bully-pulpit and exhort people to join the Army–all the while Army recruiters are struggling to fill their quotas with substandard recruits. We made “hillbilly” armor for our humvees (it works, too–it saved numerous lives in my Batallion!!!), but I wonder why it took so long to get enough armor over there. I wonder why my reserve unit did not get real body armor until Feb. 2005–after Iraqi units oftentimes had it. Just look at the way we ramped up production in 1940-42 to fight WWII. We could do it if our leaders had the guts to stand up and exhort America to make tough sacrifices, tell the farmers that their billions in subsidies need to be shifted to emergency military spending for armor and drones to patrol the roads of Iraq to prevent IEDs, etc. I agree that you fight with the equipment you have (we did it), but that’s a piss-poor excuse when the country continues to party-on like nothing is happening.
Iraq is too important to lose, and that’s what’s happened. Why would you do just enough when the future of the Middle East depends on a free, democratic Iraq? In the Arab mind, Baghdad and Cairo are the bipolar centers of gravity of the Arab world(is that statement contradictory?), and Iraq is simply too important to lose. And I know several smart officers over there right now who agree with me. Their attitude is that now we’ve gone too far down the road to get it right, and that ultimately we’re installing a government that will later be overthrown. One of my former colleagues thinks that the Sunnis will be in charge within 18 months of our departure unless Iran intervenes.
Anyway, I hope that someday the Neocons are called to the carpet for their errors. I read Bob Woodward’s book “Plan of Attack” and was flabbergasted by what was in it. I have avoided reading newer books like the Assassin’s Gate (is that what it’s called–by Packer), but after seeing Meet the Press on Sunday, I’m very tempted to read Cobra II, a book by the NY Times reporter and Gen. Bernard Trainor with the inside scoop on the war. Even Bill O’Reilly plugged the book yesterday and blasted the Army for failing to listen to its commanders when they advised killing the Fedayeen instead of advancing on Baghdad–they rightly predicted that the Fedayeen would become the backbone of the insurgency. (You can see why I’ve avoided reading these books, I’m still a little pissed about this).
I’ve always believed that America is a country that loves to win, hates to lose, and always exhibits exemplary sportsmanship when competing on the world stage. I’m not so sure anymore. As an American, I resent being hung out to lose. And on behalf of the Iraqi people, I especially resent it.
– Dan Feather
p.s. I’m not in the “hate Bush” crowd–I’m in the “Bush is incompetent” crowd. All the more disappointing since I voted for him and contributed to his campaign in 2000.
TK,
is David Thomson an alias for Dick Cheney or Karl Rove?
“Terrorist activity is decreasing and fewer people are being murdered” we are told…in light of today’s news (87 bodies, all tortured, etc.) this post gets the spin of the year icon.
ì…we are told…in light of today’s news (87 bodies, all tortured, etc.) this post gets the spin of the year icon.î
Simply do the math. The murder totals still do not surpass an national average of 250 per week. This means that outside the Sunni triangle—most Iraqis live fairly normal lives. The northern Kurdish area is virtually violence free. Things could indeed be better in Iraq. Nonetheless, the country is not even close to collapsing.
outside the Sunni triangle—
even better spin, since the 87 bodies where found in Baghdad
and, today, our Secretary of Defense announced that we are sending more troops to the theater, which we should have done much earlir.
the lack of a basis in reality clearly goes to DT
Moe
“outside the Sunni triangle—
even better spin, since the 87 bodies where found in Baghdad”
Baghdad is part of the Sunni Triangle. I guess you might have a point to make—but I have no idea what it is. It seems like your hatred of George W. Bush may hinder your ability to think and follow a logical argument.