Most of news over the past two years about the United Airlines chapter 11 case has focused on the legacy airlines operating losses, its unfunded pension obligations, and its need to overhaul or reject its collective bargaining agreements. Here is a series of posts on those various issues.
So, United has established that a legacy airline can lose money for a long time while floundering in chapter 11. However, can United continue meandering in chapter 11 without aircraft? Look at this seemingly innocuous press release that United issued late this past Friday:
A U.S. federal bankruptcy court judge has blocked a group of creditors from repossessing up to 14 airplanes from UAL Corp.’s United Airlines, saving the bankrupt carrier tens of millions of dollars.
Judge Eugene Wed off issued a temporary restraining order Friday barring the group, represented by the Chicago-based law firm Chapman & Cutler LLP, from seizing up to eight Boeing 767s and six 737s.
The group of financiers, which controls about one-third of United’s fleet, had threatened to seize the planes as early as Dec. 1 because of an impasse over their leases.
United, the nation’s No. 2 airline, is seeking to lower aircraft operating costs by renegotiating its leases with creditors. However, it argued that the Chapman group was violating antitrust laws by renegotiating as a bloc instead of as individual leaseholders, forcing United to accept higher lease rates.
Well, you say, what’s so unusual about that? Secured creditors in chapter 11 cases are automatically stayed from repossessing their collateral until they petition the Bankruptcy Court to modify the automatic injunction under Bankruptcy Code section 362 to allow them to exercise their contractual rights. Isn’t the Bankruptcy Judge simply enforcing the stay against United’s aircraft lenders?
Not exactly. Aircraft collateral is treated differently under the Bankruptcy Code than other types of collateral (financial institutions that make aircraft loans lobby well in Congress). Under section 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code, the above-described TRO is on quite shaky grounds:
(a)(1) . . . , the right of a secured party with a security interest in [aircraft] equipment, . . . or of a lessor or conditional vendor of such equipment, to take possession of such equipment in compliance with a security agreement, lease, or conditional sale contract, and to enforce any of its other rights or remedies, under such security agreement, lease, or conditional sale contract, to sell, lease, or otherwise retain or dispose of such equipment, is not limited or otherwise affected by any other provision of this title or by any power of the court.
In plain English, that says “a bank that has aircraft collateral cannot be enjoined from repossessing and selling its collateral in a chapter 11 case.” Section 1110 goes on to provide that the only limitation on an aircraft lender’s collateral rights is during the first 60 days of the chapter 11 case and that the debtor must cure any defaults under its agreement with the aircraft lender if the debtor wants to continue using the aircraft that is collateral for the lender’s loans to the debtor.
Consequently, it looks like the financial institutions that control a third of United’s fleet have had enough. As United’s management, unions, and other parties-in-interest continue to fiddle while Rome burns, I wonder whether they have examined pro formas on operating an airline without a substantial portion of its aircraft fleet? Inasmuch as the Bankruptcy Court’s decision to approve a TRO in the face of section 1110 is almost certainly in error, United’s dithering parties-in-interest better get ready to deal with a few less aircraft sooner rather than later.